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Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification,
and Distortion
Richard A. Epsteint
I. THE OMNIPRESENT CLASS ACTION
The class action represents, without question, one of the most
ubiquitous topics in modem civil law. It is only a small exaggera-
tion to say that virtually every major innovation in liability, if
brought about by litigation, will either be created by or reflected
in the class action. The reason for the omnipresence of class ac-
tions lies in their versatility. Class actions are, at their root, an
aggregation device for separate claims, and are by design tied to
no substantive theory. Class actions can, in theory, be used to
amalgamate large numbers of claims brought by separate indi-
viduals, regardless of their subject matter. Any lawyer who works
with antitrust, corporations, securities, discrimination, lending,
real property, or torts will necessarily be familiar with class ac-
tion litigation as a normal part of his or her work. It is hard to
describe class actions as a distinctive specialty when so many
lawyers both pursue and defend these suits on a daily basis.
Nor is it hard to see why class actions have surged to promi-
nence in recent years. As litigation becomes ever more complex,
the willingness and ability of individual plaintiffs to bear its costs
are correspondingly diminished. The opportunities for gains,
however, remain substantial, so entrepreneurial lawyers who
hope to profit by organizing the class of potential plaintiffs and
bringing their joint claim to a successful conclusion quickly fill
the void. The entire process was pushed along by the adoption of
the 1966 class action rules, but the reforms, like so many other
reforms of the 1960s (and other ages) had this distinctive quality:
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the initial purpose was to plug the holes that existed in the previ-
ous law. The strength and weaknesses of the proposed changes
were examined in a static sense, in that the only question asked
was how the previous stock of cases would fare under the new set
of rules. The usual response was that nettlesome limitations on
class actions, or liability generally, would be cured so that the
system would fall effortlessly into a new virtuous equilibrium.
There is no question that just this result did occur in a large
number of cases. Sensible suits that could not easily be brought
as class actions before 1966 fell into that mode after that date.
But the overall analysis is more complex, for this optimistic
account of legal transitions missed the dynamic element of the
process: what new kinds of cases would be brought into the sys-
tem, and how would those be solved under the newly created set
of class action rules? To this set of questions, little or no attention
was paid, either then or now, for it was not possible to foresee
with precision the synergistic relationship between the changed
procedures under class action law, and the great expansion of
liability of the late 1960s and early 1970s, both by common law
and by statute. Just to put the point in perspective, the mid-
1960s and early 1970s saw the arrival of the civil rights statutes,1
Medicare and Medicaid reforms,2 the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act,3 OSHA, 4 ERISA,5 the Endangered Species
Act,6 and the Environmental Protection Act,7 all of which have
been extensive enough to spawn their own separate specializa-
tions, which in combination account for a huge portion of modern
legal practice. This legislation also brought into the fold cases
that people thought lay outside of it. The rules that governed em-
For example, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified
at 28 USC § 1447 (2000) and at 42 USC §§ 1971, 1975(a)-1975(d), 2000(a) et seq (2000);
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103 (1972), codified
at 42 USC §2000(e) (2000); Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), Pub L No 92-318,
86 Stat 235, 373 (1972), codified at 20 USC § § 1681 et seq (2000).
2 Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub L No 89-97, 79 Stat 286 (1965), codified at
42 USC § 1395 (2000).
' National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub L No 89-563, 80 Stat
718 (1966), codified at 15 USC § 1381 et seq (2000).
' Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590 (1970),
codified at 29 USC §§651 et seq (2000).
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829
(1974), codified at 29 USC § § 1001 et seq (2000).
6 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973), codified at
16 USC § § 1531 et seq (2000).
7 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (1970),
codified at 42 USC § §4321 et seq (2000).
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ployment discrimination were drafted with an eye to make sure
that every case of employee termination or transfer did not be-
come the source of a civil rights action. The goal was to create a
regime in which the admitted cases of overt and invidious dis-
crimination could no longer go unpunished. But within several
years of its passage the statute expanded far beyond the scope
envisioned by its most ardent supporters. Arguments that certain
forms of discrimination were cost-justified (for example, differen-
tial wages in dangerous work because women had higher risk
rates than men) were rejected even though these forms of dis-
crimination count as rational (cost justified) to the economist . At
the same time, proof of motive and intention yielded to disparate
impact suits, with an enormous expansion in potential liability.
Much the same history has taken place with the class action,
which was introduced as a modest procedural reform in 1966,
with the same emphasis on what could be done to correct past
wrongs. Yet today the dominant pattern everywhere is to push
the envelope. In 1966, any single collision involving multiple
plaintiffs fit only uneasily within the new class action rules. To-
day in contrast, courts will certify classes that demand $100 bil-
lion in damages on behalf of over four million potential class
members, on exotic and controversial antitrust theories. 9 What
makes the analysis of this area so difficult is that the most impor-
tant judgments ultimately depend on multiple questions of de-
gree, which are often evaluated separately even though they op-
erate only in combination. The more generous theories of class
actions interact with expansions in substantive liability, and
their profound effects are profoundly synergistic. °
This simple example shows a real tension between the proper
function of a class action and its actual application. On the for-
mer, the theory of class actions is to take a weak signal and to
' For my account of the shift, see Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds (Harvard
1992).
' See, for example, In re VisaCheck IMasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 124
(2d Cir 2001) (relying on a fraud-on-the-market theory to approve a class potentially in-
cluding over four million merchants). The case recently settled for payments of one billion
dollars from MasterCard and two billion dollars from Visa before any witnesses had even
been deposed. For a criticism of the pressure that class actions place on defendants to
settle even when the potential theories of liability are tenuous, see George L. Priest, Class
Warfare, Wall St J A14 (May 5, 2003). For a reply see Lloyd Constantine, The Antitrust
Claims Against Visa/MasterCard, Wall St J A19 (May 13, 2001).
" See, for example, Tonya Smits Rodriguez, Comment, Extending the Fraud on the
Market Theory: The Second Circuit's Connection Test for SEC Rule 10b-5, 25 Iowa J Corp
L 423 (2002).
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amplify it by aggregating small claims that would not otherwise
be pursued individually, lowering the cost per individual suit. In
practice, many (but by no means all) class actions do more than
amplify the status quo ante: sometimes they also distort the out-
comes by imposing liabilities that are, when the transformations
of substance and procedure are taken into account, far more on-
erous than a rule of simple multiplication would provide. The ba-
sic mechanism is to tailor the substantive law in ways that make
complex individual suits amenable to class action litigation.
These changes will almost always be in the direction of simplifi-
cation, which allows for an increase in the number of common
issues that in turn improves the odds of class certification. But
those simplifications also make it easier for any individual plain-
tiff to prevail, resulting in excessive amplification of the original
claim. Simplification reduces some of the factual issues needed to
make out the claim and thus removes potential obstacles that
might otherwise stand in the way of plaintiffs' recovery.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the class action on
two levels. The first is a general framework of class actions,
which should then facilitate a more detailed examination of class
action litigation. This framework may not enable us to resolve all
the knotty questions of class actions once the relevant trade-offs
are identified, but at least it should help us make some sensible
first approximations. Thereafter, I shall give a couple of examples
of how amplification can turn into distortion in order to explain
why this system can go off the rails.
Accordingly, the first section of this paper outlines, in brief
compass, the general approach that I take to this, and indeed all
legal matters. In it I try to develop the appropriate balance be-
tween two imperatives, each accepted as a good in its own right:
the desire for personal control of each individual claim, and the
need for the coordination of claims brought in related matters."
Thereafter, I use these principles to explain the ends to which
class actions should be devoted and the mechanisms that might
help advance their efficient use.
" See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 615 (1997) (recognizing the
competing interests of individual autonomy and systemic efficiency); See Roger C. Cram-
ton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction,
80 Cornell L Rev 811 (1995) (discussing the tension between individual justice and collec-
tive justice); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class
Action (Yale 1987) (detailing the history of the struggle between individualism and group
litigation).
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In dealing with this issue, I begin the discussion with class
actions in the context of the law of associations. The field is vast
and covers the full range of voluntary associations, including
partnerships, charitable associations, and corporations. The main
but by no means exclusive field of action lies in the area of corpo-
rate law, both through derivative suits and direct actions by
shareholders. There is no exact cubbyhole for these actions under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as actions that "would create a risk of adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interest. " 12 That mouthful
gives the uninitiated little information as to the paradigmatic
case that falls within that provision. But one of the notes to the
Federal Rules helps fill that gap. "In an action by policy holders
against a fraternal benefit association attacking a financial reor-
ganization of the society, it would have hardly been practical, if
indeed it would have been possible, to confine the effects of a
validation of the reorganization to the individual plaintiffs." 3
(Other examples to which I shall refer include the declaration of
corporate dividends or the handling of various other corporate
distributions.) These cases are not the locus of the current con-
troversy over class actions, but I turn to them first because they
illustrate the situations in which class actions, owing to the fun-
gible interests of all group members or shareholders, have the
greatest utility. The purpose of. the discussion is to show the for-
midable difficulties that remain in the execution of the class ac-
tion ideal in the soil most congenial to its growth. Once that pat-
tern is accepted, we should be in a position to explore the com-
plexities added when class actions are removed from the associa-
tional and corporate contexts to cover claims brought under, for
example, tort, discrimination, and antitrust law. The final result
here is neither to praise nor condemn class actions en masse.
Rather it is to develop some clear appreciation that the only way
to overcome the imperfections of the ordinary rules of civil proce-
dure used for the prosecution of individual claims is to invite a
different, and sometimes larger, set of imperfections under the
class action rubric, including the distortion risk alluded to above.
12 FRCP 23(b)(1)(B).
Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 23(b)(1)(B) (1966) (citing Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v Cauble, 255 US 356 (1921)).
479
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II. THE BASIC TRADE-OFF: AUTONOMY AND FORCED EXCHANGES
A somewhat outdated name for civil procedure is adjective
law. The substantive law determines the rights and duties of or-
dinary individuals, and thus is the chief concern of any legal sys-
tem. The "adjectival" rules of procedure are sidekicks to the sub-
stantive law because their major function is to apply claims to
concrete cases whose outcomes comport with principles of the
substantive law. In dealing with those substantive issues, it is
often said that the bedrock principle of the common law lies in its
respect for individual autonomy or self-rule.14 Each person is said
to be the owner of his own body, and can decide when to steer
clear of certain transactions and when to enter into them. Indi-
vidual autonomy allows ordinary individuals immunity from ex-
ternal aggression; it explains why they are allowed to acquire the
ownership of property and why they are allowed to sell their la-
bor only on terms that they regard as personally satisfactory.
These abstract entitlements, however, remain inchoate until
one person claims that the actions of another have violated one of
these rights. So to stick only with the simplest case: the right to
individual autonomy may allow all individuals to have exclusive
control over their own body, but the content of that right becomes
most clear when some other individual invades that person by,
say, assault and battery. Similarly, individual rights to property
are crystallized only when some other person takes away or de-
stroys what they own. The right to contract is made vivid only
when some other person breaches an undertaking of the individ-
ual.
At this point we have to ask this threshold question: who
holds the cause of action for damage to the person, for loss of
property, for breach of contract? Now bedrock principles of sub-
stantive law start to blend in with the rules of civil procedure.
The usual "right" answer is that any right of action belongs to
that individual whose rights were invaded. That proposition
seems to apply not only to the traditional common law claims just
mentioned, but also to other forms of individual claims that apply
to the violation of other forms of right created under statute. The
victims of discrimination are normally entitled to sue the perpe-
" See Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 105 NE 92, 93 (NY 1914) ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine what is to be done
with his own body."); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt
Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057 (2002).
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trators of that discrimination; the victims of monopoly practices
normally hold their own claims.
My initial question about this outcome is the heretical "why?"
Here it hardly counts as a logical contradiction to assert that X
violated A's rights, but that the right of action for their vindica-
tion lies with B. Indeed, if B were an ideal claimant and A were
hopeless at litigation, then this odd regime would have some real
attractiveness not only for the Bs of this world, but for the entire
system as a whole. The defendant, X, cares not one whit who gets
his money, but only about the likelihood and magnitude of pay-
ment. If deterrence of wrongdoing is the dominant goal, then
what matters is who pays and how much: never who collects, or
why. 1 5 Let B be the perfect professional plaintiff, then these de-
fendants will face higher liabilities, and thus will take greater
steps to avoid harm. They will know a similar fate awaits them
for violating the rights of other individuals. Accordingly, they will
refrain from the deliberate invasion of these rights and will take
care to avoid the accidental violation of these rights as well. The
greater security in the person, in the protection of property, and
in the performance of contracts is enjoyed not only by the Bs of
the world, but by the As of the world as well. They might be quite
pleased to be stripped of their rights, so long as they believe that
their substantive rights will be protected by others that bring suit
in the event of loss.
The point of this fairy tale is not to defend the proposition
that holders of rights of action should not be the people who hold
the initial substantive entitlement. It is rather to show that no
necessary or logical contradiction arises from the simple fact of
that separation. Putting the matter in this particular fashion
thus requires us to think hard about the question of who gets the
right to sue and why. It thus forces us to fashion a functional ex-
planation for the unity of substantive and remedial rights, which
in turn leaves open the possibility that this unity may be desir-
able in most cases, but not in all. The conceptual difficulty of this
exercise has a real payoff in understanding some of the peculiar
features of class actions. But, for the moment, I shall defer deal-
ing with that question, and ask the simpler one: How do we make
" For the most insistent defense of this position, see David Rosenberg, Mandatory-
Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv L Rev 831 (2002);
David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in W. Kip Viscusi, ed, Regu-
lation Through Litigation 244 (AEI-Brookings 2002).
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a case for the "self-evident" proposition that A should have the
cause of action for the violation of A's rights?
The first point is that it is one thing to contemplate the sepa-
ration of substantive entitlements from rights of action, but quite
another thing to determine who has that right or action once that
severance is made. Once A and B could be different people, it is
necessary to posit some rule to decide which B is entitled to the
right of action for the substantive violation of the rights of each A.
How might this be done? One possibility is to assign the rights
arbitrarily, but that will not commend itself to anyone. A has suf-
fered a substantial loss while B gets an undeserved windfall. It
looks as though we should rather have the damage payment (if
such it be) neutralize the loss than give it to someone whose
name is drawn out of a hat. Indeed, the Aristotelian conception of
corrective justice, 16 which still has widespread support today, goes
to the opposite extreme: far from random assignment of claims, it
treats the correction of injustice as critical to the entire legal en-
terprise. It is absolutely essential that the wrongdoer pay the vic-
tim, no matter what the abstract rules of deterrence might pro-
vide.
Even if we reject random assignment, we might with an eye
to efficiency think that the right of action for the violation to A
could be auctioned off by the state, so that the winning bidder
may bring the suit and keep the proceeds of settlement or litiga-
tion. After all, auctions are used all the time to sell paintings and
tulips, so why not to sell causes of action for broken legs and un-
delivered goods? But the language of an auction invites other
questions. The auction presumably involves some form of pay-
ment for the right of action. It therefore becomes necessary to
ask, who gets the proceeds of the auction? One possibility is to
pay A the auction proceeds as compensation for the wrong he has
suffered. That solution is less than ideal if the government has to
bear the costs of running the auction, without recovering its
overhead expenses. Yet if in the end the proceeds go to A, then
why not let him conduct the auction to begin with? And if he
could do that, then why not treat him as owner of the claim who
may decide to keep the claim, auction it off, or enter into some
special risk-sharing arrangement, such as a contingent fee con-
tract with a legal specialist.
" See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Jonathan Barnes, ed, 2 The Complete Works
of Aristotle 1729, 1781-97 (Princeton 1984).
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But suppose the state decides to run this auction from the
center. Certainly A should be allowed to bid in order to recover
the right to sue on his own behalf. It is likely, moreover, that A
will be an impressive entry into the bidding wars. Prosecuting
any lawsuit for the violation of A's rights will require the coopera-
tion of A. If liability turns on whether X struck A in self-defense,
then A's testimony will be critical to overcoming this defense. In
general, A's cooperation is needed for all aspects of the case, but if
he gains nothing from suit, he has no incentive to cooperate with
the winning bidder. Other individuals will therefore discount
their bids by the attendant costs of securing cooperation. A does
not labor under this disability and therefore should have an in-
side track for the winning bid, at least if he has the resources in
question. But of course he might not. The harm caused by X could
have drained him of cash resources, and even our sophisticated
capital markets do not allow a potential cause of action to serve
as 100 percent collateral for a loan. (No risk-neutral bank could
lend even $10 on an asset worth $1,000 if that value consists of a
50 percent chance of $2,000 and a 50 percent chance of $0. The
high variance in payoffs leaves the bank with a huge downside
and no participation in the upside.)
The auction rule does not seem to be all that attractive in the
abstract. This situation does not involve individuals who auction
their own property, keeping the proceeds for themselves. Rather,
it is a state device for deciding who gets the right to own the
cause of action in the first place. Many individuals, most notably
Ronald Dworkin, have suggested that all property in the state of
nature be auctioned off by the state to the highest bidder. 17 But
that suggestion also loses its appeal once we realize how difficult
it would be to organize its operation before all potential bidders
died of starvation. We (by which I mean all early societies with-
out exception) therefore adopt a rule of first possession for the
acquisition of land and chattels from the state of nature.18
Reluctantly, we reach a similar conclusion when talking
about the auction rule. A rule that assigns the cause of action to
the victim of the wrong is less expensive to operate than any auc-
tion that we might set up. It enjoys legitimacy with a populous
that quickly tires of strange mind games played by fevered law
17 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 65-71
(Harvard 2000).
" See John Locke, A Second Treatise of Government Ch 5 (Liberal Arts 1952) (making
just this point in favor of the labor theory of ownership).
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professors; it usually ends up giving the right of action to an indi-
vidual who is in a good position to prosecute the suit himself; and,
most critically, it allows that person to enter into side contracts
with other individuals (call them lawyers) for the prosecution of
that suit if it turns out that they do not have the skills to do it
themselves. Indeed, in principle it could allow the individuals to
sell the claims to other persons, even by auction, if that seems
appropriate, as it often is in cases that involve the collection of
receivables. But most often the contingent fee arrangement is the
vehicle of choice because it gives access to adjudication to ag-
grieved persons with both limited wealth and limited ability to
monitor the conduct of their lawyers. The bottom line here is that
the initial allocation of the right of action to the person who suf-
fers from its breach appears on examination to comport not only
with the shadowy dictates of natural justice, but also to have real
efficiency justifications that no global auction can duplicate. It
quickly and clearly assigns the right of action in question to a
determinate owner, regardless of its substantive content; and
that person can make voluntary dispositions of the cause of ac-
tion, including contingent fee or other sharing arrangements, in
the event that he is not the ideal claimant. Auctions are possible,
after a fashion. But they are run not by the state, but by the
owner of the cause of action, where they need not take the form of
a sale but follow the lines of the ubiquitous contingent fee ar-
rangement.
Once we have reached this simple empirical conclusion, then
we can ask the painful but necessary question: Is it good in each
and every case? As often happens in exercises of this sort, our
mental map of the transactions in question takes a particular
form that is nowhere required by the statement of the problem
itself. In this case, our usual view that a cause of action flows
from the violation of the substantive right takes on the following
salient features. First, there is one and only one person who is
victim of the violation of the right. It is B, the defendant, who has
taken A's plow; no other plow has been taken. The value of the
thing is large not only in absolute terms but also relative to the
costs A has to incur to recover that plow from B. The legal sys-
tem, moreover, will yield reliable results, such that A can prose-
cute his suit for a small cost, with some confidence that he will
win on a meritorious claim.
Once we make these implicit assumptions explicit, we can
identify why the system of private rights is workable. By adopt-
[2003:484
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ing an inflexible rule that each owner of property retains the
right of action for its theft or destruction, we have eliminated a
major stumbling block in organizing the legal system. A, of
course, must still prove that the plow was his, for the defendant
will win if he can show that he lent the plow to the plaintiff with
the understanding that it would be returned on demand. But no
system of procedure can eliminate that factual dispute. Our rule
only gets rid of the distraction that arises when some third party
is endowed with this cause of action. That said, the plaintiff here
will act normally as a self-interested person, which means that he
will bring suit only if he estimates at the outset that his expected
gain from the suit will exceed his expected costs. Both the cost of
the legal system and the reliability of its processes enter into the
plaintiff's crude calculations. Thus if the plow is worth $1,000
and the cost of suit equals $100, then, if recovery is certain, A will
sue, for a net $900 leaves him better off, even if he is worse off
than if the plow had never been taken. But this calculation ig-
nores the risk of loss. If A thinks that he has only a 75 percent
chance of winning the case, his expected gain drops to $650, given
the $750 he expects to recover and the $100 cost of the suit (i.e.,
0.75 x $1,000 - $100). But let the costs go up to $500, and the
chances of success drop to 40 percent, and all of a sudden, the
suit does not look attractive no matter how sound the underlying
cause of action: a $400 recovery is less than $500 cost.
We are now in a position to understand the origin and appeal
of the class action in some, but not all cases. Quite simply the
unthinkable becomes thinkable when the basic scenario
changes-that is, what would otherwise be an unprofitable suit,
given the low probability of success and high costs of bringing the
suit, becomes a profitable one. All that we need to do in order to
make this happen is to alter three parameters. The first of these
is that the number of individuals similarly situated with respect
to a common defendant is very large. The second is that the loss
sustained by each individual is relatively small. The third is that
the administrative costs of individual suits turn out to be quite
high. In these circumstances, we can now see the consequences of
a rule that allows each aggrieved individual to bring his own suit.
Quite simply, he will not accept this invitation if the costs of liti-
gation exceed the level of recovery, which could easily happen
with the high price of lawyers. Within the framework of volun-
tary transactions, we might expect A to sell his claim, but any
485
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individual buyer will face all the problems that beset A and still
have to enlist A's support in order to make his claim good.
The obvious escape hatch to this impasse in a voluntary
world is for all the individuals to pool their claims together (un-
der the rules of permissive joinder, as authorized under Rule 20
of the Federal Rules19) in order to take advantage of what they
hope will prove to be economies of scale. These rules limit the use
of permissive joinder to cases in which the parties pursue their
rights "in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences."2" But this limita-
tion on the use of permissive joinder hardly binds at all, for
unless this condition is satisfied the individual plaintiffs have
little reason to pursue cooperative activities. After all, the hope of
parties in a permissive joinder situation is that the cost of suit
will rise less rapidly than the value of the amalgamated claims,
so that in union they will find strength. But typically they quickly
learn that these negotiations are fraught with difficulty, for
someone has to put together the pool that divides expenses and
recovery, and someone has to decide how much each claimant
should contribute, both initially and thereafter. Since we are, by
hypothesis, still in a world of free bargaining, nothing compels
each person to accept a pro rata share of expenses and gains upon
joining into the pool in question. It is possible for individuals to
hold out for a larger share of the gain on condition of joining the
business. The process could take place quite subtly, as when one
party insists on a minimum level of recovery out of the common
pool, which leaves other people at greater risk and could induce
them to make the same demands, as it were, until 150 percent of
the pie is fully accounted for.
What makes this problem so difficult to deal with, moreover,
is that holdouts, wishing to avoid rebuke, often take concealed
rather than brazen approaches toward individual aggrandize-
ment. They assert that their claim really is worth a great deal
more than anyone else thinks and calibrate their demands to the
perceived value of their interest. Bargaining breakdown is high in
these circumstances, which is just what we should expect. We can
think of the defendant, as seen through the eyes of members of
the plaintiff class, as though he were a common pool asset (say oil
and gas under the land of multiple landowners), and the plain-
" FRCP 20(a).
2 Id.
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tiffs each as claimants to some fraction of the pool. Often it hap-
pens that the surface owners cannot agree on any appropriate
split of expenses and recovery, so each takes an independent
course of action that leads to excessive costs of extraction, the
necessary byproduct of which is the reduction of the total oil and
gas taken from the pool. Permissive joinder in these cases can
work in some circumstances, but often it does not. It is these fail-
ures that explain the rise of the class action.
III. CLASS ACTIONS FOR VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AS A MODEL
To see how the argument works, it is best to examine it in an
environment that is most hospitable to the class action, that is,
those situations where all plaintiffs have interests that have been
crafted the same under the substantive law. Suppose that the
question at hand is disputed behavior in a corporation, partner-
ship, or some voluntary association. A common version of the
complaint is that a key corporate officer has purchased a collec-
tive asset in a cozy transaction for a sum well below its market
price. The remedy in this case is to unravel the transaction so
that the asset is returned to the corporation and the cash to the
individual buyer. (I ignore all complications with the time value
of money, subsequent transactions, and the like.) The question is:
Who is in the best position to maintain the suit to undo this
transaction? In principle the action belongs to the corporation;
but, notwithstanding its lofty legal status, a corporation has no
independent powers of self-generation. Usually the directors act
as "its" agents and in this case they have fallen asleep at the
switch. So at least one shareholder has to step up to the plate for
the corporation (in other words, for the other shareholders in
question). So how is this transaction organized?
One possible way is to think of a permissive joinder suit
among shareholders, but this fails for a number of critical rea-
sons. First, the chronic coordination problems can arise with
shareholders every bit as much as they can arise with surface
owners. Second, the proposed relief is indivisible in that it bene-
fits one shareholder as much (or as little) as the next. As noted
earlier, the proper procedure is to unravel the transaction so that
the thing is restored to the corporation, usually with its purchase
price refunded to the purchaser. That form of relief benefits all
shareholders whether they participate in the litigation or not: it
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is not just the case as "a practical matter," as Rule 23 says;21
rather it is as a necessary matter deriving from the structure of
the corporation itself. In this setting, we now worry that some
shareholders will simply choose to free ride on the efforts of oth-
ers. They will bear none of the costs of running the suit (and the
consequent risk of failure). Yet they will stand to gain equally
with all other shareholders once the corporation has recovered
the asset in question. The danger, therefore, in this situation is
not that of excessive and ungrounded suits by rapacious class
action attorneys. Unless something is done to fix up the imbal-
ance, the real risk is that serious wrongdoing at the corporate
level will go unchecked for want of a champion to deal with the
problem.
The standard response has been to craft the derivative action
whose origin has been neatly summarized as follows:
In these circumstances, the shareholders' injury (diminu-
tion in the value of their shares) derives from the fact that
the alleged misconduct has reduced the value of the corpo-
ration's assets. Further, this type of derivative injury is
suffered in common by all shareholders according to their
proportionate interest in the corporation. The sharehold-
ers' derivative suit was created by equity courts to permit
a shareholder to vindicate wrongs done to the corporation
as a whole that management, because of either self-
interest or neglect, would not remedy.2
So we can now start to see how, at least in some core cases,
the class action operates as a system of forced exchanges that
works for the benefit of the individuals who are subject to the
state-generated coercion to join a common cause of action. At this
point we are not talking about class actions across the board, but
solely one special instance of them, the derivative suit, (or its
analogue for associations and partnerships). These lawsuits are
by no means easy affairs to operate, even in the best of times. The
derivative suit works for the benefit of shareholders, but it does
not protect any creditor interests. In some cases the mechanism
will falter if individual shareholders buy and sell shares in the
interval between the time that the illegal corporate act was com-
2 FRCP 23(b)(1)(B).
Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, and Robert C. Morris, Cases and Materials on
Corporations 785-86 (Little, Brown 3rd ed 1989).
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mitted and the time that it was discovered (causing later inves-
tors to have a greater return than earlier investors). But for these
purposes, it is the simple pattern that best illustrates the poten-
tial of the class action.
The basic logic is this: the knight who steps forward to main-
tain the suit is paid by the corporation out of the winnings of the
action. This simple expedient at first look has all the right incen-
tive features. In the first place, once we pierce the corporate veil,
we discover that the champion has worked for the benefit of all
the other shareholders. Since these individuals all hold fungible
interests, we can treat their fractional interest in the corporation
as marking their precise stake in the outcome of the litigation. It
is not as though the claim is, in the words of Rule 23 "typical" of
those of other class members.2 It is that these claims are all
"identical," so that from a structural point of view we cannot con-
ceive of a better class representative.
At this point the conclusion clearly follows: once the action is
successfully brought, the payment issue can be solved by ordering
the corporation (in other words, the shareholders) to make an
appropriate payment to the outside champion. If the applicable
rules so allow, the corporation in turn could recover some of those
fees from the wrongdoer under a version of the winner-takes-all
method. But that wrinkle should depend more on the fee shifting
rules generally, and not on the particulars of class actions. Each
member of the class bears the same fractional interest in the
payment as he obtains from the successful recovery, so that the
rule in question divides up the gains from the transaction in ac-
cordance with their respective investments. No one is allowed to
opt out of this particular class,2 which is just as it should be, be-
cause the nature of the relief-restoration to the corporation-
works to his benefit. Why, then, would anyone want to back out
when the alternative is to get nothing at all?
IV. How CLASS ACTIONS DISTORT THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Invariance in Aggregation
Thus far it looks as though the derivative suit is the world's
perfect class action in that it forces all shareholders to deviate
'2 FRCP 23(a).
2 FRCP 23(c)(2).
489
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
from their initial property holdings in ways that leave them bet-
ter off than before. In practice this conclusion is, of course, too
optimistic because the complete package requires us to develop
rules for the selection and compensation of attorneys, which is
not so easily done. I shall pass by these issues here, in order to
pursue the central theme of this paper, which asks whether, and
if so how, the aggregation of individual claims within the class-
action format leads to a distortion of the substantive law that
works typically in favor of the plaintiffs, even within the class
action-friendly confines of these corporate and associational
cases.
At this point, the vital concern involves the interplay be-
tween substantive and procedural law in dealing with class ac-
tions. As noted earlier, treating the class action as a procedural
rule carries with it profound implications. Quite simply, as a mat-
ter of theory, the class action functions solely as an aggregation
device to allow the pursuit of claims that could otherwise not be
brought because of the high rate of administrative costs relative
to the anticipated recovery. As the Supreme Court held in Am-
chem Products, Inc, v Windsor,2" the central purpose of the class
action "is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into
something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."26 In
principle, therefore, we should hold the substantive law constant
regardless of whether the plaintiffs proceed by individual action,
permissive joinder, or class action. Thus, the class format does
not alter the terms of the basic cause of action; nor does it intro-
duce some new defenses, or eliminate others, in the prosecution
of the case. The whole point here is to avoid any extraneous influ-
ence that would give parties a reason to either bring or refuse to
bring a class action. The substantive outcomes should not be dis-
torted by the choice of procedural vehicle.
This invariance constraint has powerful roots in other sub-
stantive areas of law. One common theatre in which the point is
raised is bankruptcy.2 Ordinary firms have relationships with
multiple creditors antecedent to and outside of bankruptcy. The
2' 521 US 591 (1997).
26 Id at 617 (quoting Mace v Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F3d 338, 344 (1997)).
7 See Douglas G. Baird, Thomas H. Jackson, and Barry E. Adler, Cases, Problems,
and Materials on Bankruptcy Ch 2 (Foundation 2001).
490 [2003:
475] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 491
ideal bankruptcy system allows for the coordination of multiple
claims, the marshalling of the defendant's assets, and a key deci-
sion over whether to liquidate or reorganize the basic business.2
These issues are hard enough to resolve in their own right, and
the ideal set of procedural rules is not one that induces parties to
go into or to avoid bankruptcy solely on the grounds of the rela-
tive procedural advantages of the various fora. Thus, it would be
quite dangerous if the legal position allowed a plaintiff-creditor to
defeat a statute of limitations defense available in state court by
filing for bankruptcy. At this point the plaintiff-creditor may well
choose an inefficient place to litigate in order to gain a partisan
advantage. Defendants will have equal and opposite incentives,
and the whole system could easily grind to a halt, for in both
cases the private advantage creates a social disadvantage.
Likewise, in dealing with the regulation of private land use
disputes between neighbors, it is important to keep the actions
(often class actions) that the state can bring on behalf of some
neighbors against others parallel to the ordinary tort actions that
some neighbors can bring against another. Let the state be given
substantive advantages not available to the individual plaintiffs,
and enforcement will migrate into public hands even if the pri-
vate law offers systematically superior substantive solutions on
the issues. Likewise, if the substantive private law is systemati-
cally more advantageous to plaintiffs, they now have an incentive
to resist more efficient class actions solely to obtain partisan ad-
vantages. In all these cases, then, we should be careful to see that
the amalgamation of claims does not alter the balance of power
between the two sides except insofar as it overcomes the transac-
tional obstacles that justify the use of the class action in the first
place. It is for just this reason that zoning rules are so often prob-
lematic. In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Commission,2 the
state sought to prevent any construction on a beachfront lot by
regulation. 30 No private neighbor would be able to obtain an in-
junction to that effect, but would have to purchase a restrictive
covenant. The switch from the private to the public forum should
not result in a fundamental change in the ground rules, and the
strength of that decision is that it prevented that maneuver from
happening in the most egregious fashion, but left open the possi-
8 See Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrisson, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking. 17
JL, Econ, & Org 356 (2001).
505 US 1003 (1992).
Id at 1007.
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bility of sustaining lesser forms of regulation without compensa-
tion. As with bankruptcy, the switch in forum should not result in
a radical change in the rules of compensation.'
This program is, moreover, easy to implement in connection
with the ordinary derivative suit against private associations and
corporate defendants. Here all the plaintiffs are in precisely the
same position, so that the court need only ask itself how it would
resolve the suit if all the shares in question were held by a single
person who had an action against members of the board of direc-
tors. But the concerns alleviated here become much more serious
in the modern class action in which amalgamation and distortion
could go hand in hand.
B. Class Actions for Damages
This invariance proposition is, however, sorely tested in the
context of the modern class action, which arises outside the cor-
porate and association situations where what is sought is a resto-
ration in cash or kind to the association or corporation. Right off
the bat it should be clear that the efficiency of the class action is
necessarily reduced as it is carried over into these new situations:
no longer do we have any fungible corporate shares that certify
the indivisible nature of the class relief and the parallel nature of
the individual claims; additionally, it is no longer necessary to
limit the class suit to a single (corporate) defendant, which in-
-creases the complexity of its administration. The first of these
elements falls to the wayside because there is no legal entity to
which the damages in question can be paid. When someone is run
over by a truck, gouged by a monopolist, or victimized by dis-
crimination or consumer or securities fraud, he sustains his loss
in his individual capacity. The usual demand is for cash relief, to
be paid to each victim separately. These individuals' claims,
moreover, may be analogous in some ways but different in oth-
ers. 32 The individual plaintiffs may have been sold goods at differ-
ent times, for different prices, by different salesmen. Sharehold-
ers may have bought and sold stocks at different times in the pe-
"' For my discussion of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan L Rev 1369 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council, 26 Loyola LA Law Rev 955 (1993).
" See, for example, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc, Tires Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 288 F3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir 2002) (demonstrating Judge Easterbrook's merciless
dissection of such claims).
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riod before a takeover bid is announced. Often the claims involve
individuals in different states with different substantive laws.
The claims may have some elements in common, but also have
some important differences. Often the salience of these differ-
ences and similarities may not be fully apparent at the outset of
the suit, but only become apparent once discovery has been un-
dertaken, or even, perhaps, only at trial. The upshot is that the
critical decision on class action certification often has to take
place prior to any genuine assessment as to what the ultimate
shape of the claims will be. In this regard, the identification of
appropriate class members could easily shift over the life of the
litigation.
To their credit, the current class action rules appear to rec-
ognize the difference in context. The rules contain no provisions
for opt-outs for Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) class actions,
where the relief is indivisible, but recognizes them for class ac-
tions brought under 23(b)(3): "the court shall direct to the mem-
bers of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort."' Newspaper notification
will not work when names and addresses are available.3'
The additional layers of complexity in ordinary damage class
actions do not eliminate any of the difficulties of class admini-
stration in the context of derivative actions. But they do add a
number of additional elements that require some closer examina-
tion. Owing to the want of parallelism, the question arises of
whether all persons similarly situated-itself a term of art-must
become members of the class whether they want to or not. At
least one strand of thought, championed most conspicuously by
Professor David Rosenberg, claims that this mandatory approach
is correct, and holds, in effect, that the conscription of individual
plaintiffs into the class action really works to their benefit, such
that they have no reason to opt out of the class to control their
own suit. The law can make that judgment for them with lower
cost and higher reliability. 6 Indeed in one sense his position goes
a step further. Since the real question is deterrence of defen-
dants, he takes the view that there is no particular reason to
FRCP 23(c)(2).
3' See Schroeder v City of New York, 317 US 208, 212-13 (1961).
See Rosenberg, 115 Harvard L Rev 831 (cited in note 15).
See Issacharoff, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057 (cited in note 14) (exploring legal stan-
dards for determining propriety of mandatory class actions).
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want to distribute the money to any members of the victim
class.37 Their protection comes in a different form: stronger deter-
rence reduces the occasions on which compensation is required.3
At this point, the entire system becomes rickety because the con-
tours of a "mass tort" are far from clear in the abstract. With the
asbestos litigation, for example, different individuals were ex-
posed under different working conditions to fibers produced by
different manufacturers at different times. Some of these are ex-
posure-only cases; others involve physical harm, which might be
caused by other agents.39 In some cases it might prove hard to
decide whether certain workers should be included in a class or
not. That decision is momentous enough when the stakes are how
the litigation should proceed. But the boundary condition would
become far more salient if class members received no compensa-
tion at the same time individual tort claimants could get full
compensation. At this point, the class action ceases to be a simple
aggregation device. It becomes an on/off switch for vitally differ-
ent legal regimes. 4°
Even if we reject (as current law manifestly does) the view
that ex post compensation is irrelevant, powerful implications
still flow for the governance of class action litigation. This posi-
tion presupposes that the judgment should be collective and not
individual, such that a person who objected to the strategies pur-
sued by the class would be required to remain a class member on
the ground that the economies of scale in running the class action
would leave him better off than before. There is obviously a pow-
erful paternalistic streak in this argument. Surely a consumer
class that has 100,000 potential members could operate if some
fraction of them decided to opt out, perhaps to form a second class
under different leadership. It also becomes hard to insist on their
participation in the class if these dissenters have fundamental
strategic disagreements with the lawyers and/or class committee
that take direct control over the litigation. It may well be too ex-
pensive to try to recruit individuals into the class, but the trans-
action costs do not preclude a default position that preserves the
individual right to opt out on receipt of notice, especially if they
wish to join smaller, more cohesive classes. This issue could prove
Rosenberg, 115 Harv L Rev at 832-33 (cited in note 15).
Id at 841-43.
9 See Amchem, 521 US at 624.
40 For further discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Implications for Legal Reform, in W.
Kip Viscusi, ed, Regulation through Litigation 310, 347-48 (AEI-Brookings 2002).
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of especial importance in those situations where state-based
classes have greater internal coherence than nationwide classes.
There is already some authority that indicates that state-based
classes should be the preferred norm insofar as the variations in
state law reduce the predominance of common issues and place
additional strains on the operation of the class. 41 Nationwide
classes are, of course, more plausible for causes of action based on
federal law, but highly troublesome when state and federal
counts are joined in the same master complaint. The uniformity
of the federal claim is compromised by the wide diversity in the
various state causes of action.
Stated otherwise, the situation with individual claims differs
fundamentally from the derivative suit in that it is no longer the
case that the provision of a remedy to one person necessarily pro-
vides a like remedy to another. When one person opts out of the
class to bring his own suit for money damages, all other individu-
als may proceed under the class rubric if they please. The key
point here is to make sure that those who hang back do not get
the benefit of the offensive use of res judicata should the class
action be successful, while reserving the right to bring their indi-
vidual suits anew should that action fail.42
Once individuals are allowed to opt out, they must be able to
receive some notice, by publication or personal mailing, about the
terms and conditions under which the class action will proceed,
as Rule 23 provides.f In many cases where the individual sums
for the class are small (as with the miscalculation of interest
rates on small personal loans), most people will choose to stay
put, assuming that they pay any attention to the matter at all.
But, nothing about the current structure of the rules of civil pro-
cedure limits ordinary class actions to small overcharge cases.
Huge tort actions and substantial antitrust claims may also be
41 See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir 1995)
(quoting Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (Columbia 1973)).
" See, for example, Parklane Hosiery v Shore, 439 US 322, 332-33 (1979) (holding
that the defendant corporation was collaterally estopped from relitigating in a private
securities action an issue resolved against them in a prior suit brought by the govern-
ment). Note that the use of offensive collateral estoppel follows the 1966 reforms. In prin-
ciple, this should incline plaintiffs to steer clear of the class action in the hopes that they
can take advantage of a favorable judgment if the first plaintiff succeeds but litigate anew
if he does not. But the actual calculations are much more complicated than this simple
model suggests. The party who hangs back may be denied the use of offensive collateral
estoppel if too many cases go the other way; or the individual suit may not be worth bring-
ing even if preclusion takes place on one element of a complex case.
" FRCP 23(c)(2).
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brought in this form, and here the choice of whether to opt out is
far weightier because the damages are anything but "paltry." In
these cases, moreover, individual plaintiffs may well decide to
commence their suit before any class action could begin, so that it
is highly undesirable that a plaintiff be bound to the class unless
at the very least he receives actual notice of the suit, and proba-
bly not even then unless he agrees to a stay of his own litigation
pending the outcome of the class action. After all, if two individu-
als brought suit, neither would be stopped in his tracks simply
because he had notice of the other suit. Some evidence of collusive
or opportunistic behavior would seemingly be required.
The issue of class membership has, moreover, important con-
sequences for the defendant, although it is difficult in the ab-
stract to say which way they cut. On the one hand, corralling all
the plaintiffs in an individual class action reduces the litigation
costs for the defendant and avoids the possibility of follow-on
suits (from which the plaintiffs can learn from earlier strategic
mistakes even if they do not have the benefit of res judicata). On
the other hand, the creation of a huge nationwide class makes it
impossible for a defendant to diversify its litigation portfolio. The
litigation may easily assume what some courts have called "you-
bet-the-company" proportions" and lead to what has been called
perhaps somewhat loosely coercive settlements. 45 The high stakes
may well induce some juries, and indeed some judges, to adopt a
compromise position that is ruinous to the defendant's interest,
and the possibility of error in so complex a lawsuit is something
that an innocent defendant should greet with dread. After all, a
10 percent exposure to a ten billion dollar verdict counts as real
money, even today.
The amalgamation of individual damage claims raises yet
another question of no simple proportions. Which claimants, hold-
ing which claims, should be eligible to participate in a class ac-
tion in the first place? That problem was solved almost by defini-
tion in the derivative suit because each plaintiff occupied a posi-
tion that was largely indistinguishable from other members of
the class. The issue of class membership is solved in the ordinary
action by making each shareholder a member of the class to the
extent of his own interest. But with separate claims the matter
" Szabo v Bridgeport Machines, Inc, 249 F3d 672, 675 (7th Cir 2001) (noting that
class certification would turn a $200,000 dispute into a $2 million dispute).
" Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary R. Kane, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure § 16.7
(West 2d ed 1993).
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becomes far murkier. The key trade-off is easy to state. The gains
from amalgamation increase as the claims are more similar to
each other; but these economies of scale are much reduced to the
extent that individual claims differ from one another on some
material point.
In 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made a con-
scious effort to liberalize the scope of the class action by adopting
a posture that, at bottom, asks whether "the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members."' This question of
predominance of common issues covers not only those issues rele-
vant to the plaintiff's skeletal prima facie case, but to the full
range of claims or defenses raised in the case.47
That predominance requirement is generally satisfied in
cases of antitrust violation where all sales within a given period
were made as part of the same business scheme to the same set of
plaintiffs.' The level of perceived overcharge (assuming that the
members of the plaintiff class have standing to sue, which may be
problematic in some cases of "indirect purchasers")49 is roughly
constant, so that once the difference between the monopoly and
the competitive price is determined for one party in one transac-
tion, then it is largely determined for all." This argument pre-
supposes that a single scheme controlled multiple separate
transactions, such that the outer limits of the class could well be
sensitive to changes in the defendant's pricing policies or its rela-
tionships with other firms in the industry. There remains the
constant gnawing problem that distinct state law claims may well
be governed by different laws that make their amalgamation
harder to justify.51 But in general these cases will be amenable to
some level of class formation. Even if all potential plaintiffs do
'6 FRCP 23(b)(3).
" See Amchem, 521 US at 622 (noting that the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(2) also extends to any defenses to the basic cause of action).
" In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 FRD 682, 697-98 (N D Minn 1995) (discuss-
ing the presumption that price-fixing conspiracies have a common impact on all purchas-
ers of the product in the affected market).
"' See Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977) (barring indirect purchasers from
using a pass-on theory to recover treble damages for price-fixing under the Clayton Act).
"0 See, for example, Potash, 159 FRD at 697-98 (calculating damages in an antitrust
action by determining overcharge and then multiplying by the unit or dollar volume each
plaintiff purchased from the defendant).
" See Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 821 (1985) (rejecting the applica-
tion of local state law to a transaction with little relation to the forum in order to satisfy
the procedural requirement of a common question of law).
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not fit snugly within the confines of a single class, it is easy to
imagine a couple of subclasses that will cover the vast bulk of
cases.
The problem of class actions becomes much more difficult in
dealing with tort claims, including mass tort claims. The original
notes to the 1966 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made it seem
doubtful that any ordinary tort claim could be subject to class
actions:
"A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous per-
sons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action be-
cause of the likelihood that significant questions, not only
of damages but of liability and defenses to liability would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways."52
Thus, even if the same car hit two individuals at the same time,
the issues in the two cases could overlap but not be precisely the
same. Much here could turn on the theory of liability. If liability
were strict, so that the only question was whether this defendant
hit both plaintiffs, then the issue could easily be common between
the parties. But if liability is based on negligence, then the defen-
dant might have been negligent with respect to the plaintiff in
plain view but not with respect to one that was not within his line
of vision. Or some jurisdictions could adopt a principle of "trans-
ferred negligence," such that the defendant who was aware that
one plaintiff was in the field of danger is liable in negligence to a
second plaintiff who could have been spared injuries if the defen-
dant had taken only those precautions needed to deal with the
plaintiff in plain view.
The situation with mass torts, of course, only becomes more
difficult when the defendant has engaged in a particular line of
business over a long period of time, such as the selling of asbestos
or a pharmaceutical product. In these cases, we lose the Aristote-
lian unities of time and space, so that one might think that only
rarely would the class action be appropriate in suits of this sort
under the Federal Rules. But a set of ambitious certifications in a
wide variety of cases, moving from blood transfusions to harm
from cigarettes, indicates how the law has migrated from initial
cautious attitudes in these cases to a far more aggressive stance.
A similar migration can be found in cases involving misrepresen-
tations, where the 1966 attitude toward misrepresentations,
" Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 23(b)(3) (1966).
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which was prepared to allow many actions where the separate
cases had a "common core," but not in those instances where "al-
though having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited
for treatment as a class action if there were material variation in
the representations made or in the kinds of degrees of reliance by
the persons to whom they were addressed."" The current attitude
seems to be that even if the common issues do not dominate the
lawsuits, the appropriate response is to use the class action for
those issues that are common and, thereafter, to allow the cases
to be tried or settled separately: strategic advantage to the plain-
tiff.54
This brief discussion shows how difficult it is to decide at the
outset of the lawsuit whether the common issues are sufficient to
dominate the separate ones. What is the cart and what is the
horse? Normally we would like to know whether plaintiffs are
similarly situated before we are called upon to decide what legal
theory is relevant in their case. But now it looks as though we
cannot decide whether two or more claims are dominated by
common issues until we decide which theory of liability is in-
voked. The problem, moreover, only gets worse when the plain-
tiffs seek to pursue class actions and unities of time and place are
not strictly observed.
For example, in product liability actions the defendant may
have sold a given drug in different tablet sizes with different
warnings in different locations over different times. It could be
that the jurisdiction in question uses a strict liability theory for
any defects, at which point the variations in the level of care may
not matter. But, if the action relates to the duty to warn, a warn-
Id.
See, for example, Robinson v Metro-North Commuter Line, 267 F3d 147, 167-68 (2d
Cir 2001) (finding that "litigating the pattern-or-practice liability phase for the class as a
whole would reduce the range of issues in dispute and promote judicial economy"); see also
Valentino v Carter-Wallace, Inc, 97 F3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir 1996) ("Even if the common
questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of
the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to
isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of
these particular issues."). FRCP 24(c)(4)(A) in turn provides that "an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues...." If FRCP
24(c)(4)(A) is read to allow class action status to be determined issue by issue, then it
makes a dead letter of the overall predominance requirement for FRCP 23(b)(3) class
actions, which is why this provision is preferably read to provide a mere "housekeeping
rule" that does not upset the requirements for a FRCP 23(b)(3). See Castano v American
Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734, 745 n 21 (5th Cir 1996). The Supreme Court in Amchem appears
to look at predominance in connection with the full range of anticipated issues raised in
the case. See Amchem, 521 US at 622-23.
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ing that was effective in 1980, when the knowledge base was
more limited, may turn out to be insufficient in 1990 when the
level of scientific knowledge became greater. The situation gets
no easier if it turns out that the role of intermediate parties, or of
the plaintiffs themselves differs in some material way that is
found relevant to the lawsuit. The individual incidents could eas-
ily take place in different states.
C. Aggregation and Distortion
The difficulties with respect to damage class actions quickly
raise the question of aggregation versus distortion. One possible
approach is to let the chips fall where they may. The first thing
that the court does is to find out the full level of heterogeneity
among class members by taking the substantive law as it is, and
not as it might become. If the differences are too large, then the
class action fails, either because there are no "typical" claims to
meet the threshold requirements for any class action under Rule
23(a) or because it is not possible to meet the predominance re-
quirement under Rule 23(b)(3).5
Just this remorseless reading of the class action law was
found in Judge Easterbrook's forceful opinion denying both na-
tionwide and statewide class certification for breach of warranty
claims for Firestone and Bridgestone tires that performed poorly
and were subject to recall.' The initial question in these cases
concerned the choice of law issue. The plaintiffs in Bridge-
stone/Firestone argued that all these recall cases should be
treated as contract, not tort, cases, so that they could all be adju-
dicated under the substantive law of each defendant's principal
place of business.57 The traditional rule which ties contract claims
to the place where the consumer resides, typically the place of
sale, would obviously place a major obstacle in the path of a na-
tionwide class action. ' 8 Judge Easterbrook found that the plain-
tiff's reinterpretation of Indiana choice-of-law rules was clear:
Indiana would apply its own consumer protection laws to any
transaction involving an in-state consumer who purchased goods
within the state.59 From that point, the nationwide class was
headed toward extinction: "It follows that Indiana's choice-of-law
, For a discussion of the two-tiered approach, see id at 613-14.
Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F3d 1012.
r7 Id at 1017.
' Id.
59 Id.
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rule selects the 50 states and multiple territories where the buy-
ers live, and not the place of the sellers' headquarters for these
suits."
60
What about a statewide class? In the next breath, Easter-
brook looked over the substantive law in light of the many differ-
ent factual patterns and held that the differences between the
proposed class members' cases prevailed:
About 20% of the Ford Explorers were shipped without
Firestone tires. The Firestone tires supplied with the ma-
jority of the vehicles were recalled at different times; they
may well have differed in their propensity to fail, and this
would require sub-subclassing among the owners of Ford
Explorers with Firestone tires. Some of these vehicles
were resold and other have not been; the resales may have
reflected different discounts that could require vehicle-
specific litigation. Plaintiffs contend that many of the fail-
ures occurred because Ford and Firestone advised the
owners to under inflate their tires, leading them to over-
heat. Other factors also affect heating; the failure rate
(and hence the discount) may have been higher in Arizona
than in Alaska.6'
And so it goes. A clear knowledge of a fair sampling of the
probable issues in the case doomed this class action, and has
made the Seventh Circuit a most inhospitable jurisdiction for
large class actions. I think that in most cases this analysis is
sound, in that the common elements in many mass torts are far
less dominant than others believe. I would follow, as many fed-
eral courts today do not, the lead of the 1966 Federal Rules in
presumptively denying class actions in most mass tort cases.6
Admittedly, this result may place some plaintiffs at a serious dis-
advantage, in that the defendant is geared up with a standard
form defense that it tweaks in each individual case. But even in
these cases, the issues of defendant's liability, causal interven-
tion, plaintiffs knowledge or misuse, and plaintiffs damages
could all differ from individual to individual, so that when the
dust settles the standard form defense may not be all that stan-
dard. It remains possible, of course, for plaintiffs to form a volun-
o Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F3d at 1018.
61 Id.
' Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 23 (1966).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
tary, loose alliance in which they share information about com-
mon issues while controlling their individual causes of action. But
it is much riskier to follow the pattern of amalgamation, for once
the cases are together, the individual differences in the plaintiff's
cases will be bled out of the equation, so that all suits will appear
to be cut from the same cloth. As the choice of forum will nor-
mally lie within the control of plaintiffs, it is likely that the sub-
stantive law will drift in their favor.
As will quickly become evident, there are many jurisdictions
that are less responsive to the fear that the aggregation of indi-
vidual claims will lead not only to (unbiased) amplification, but
also to distortion. Here the great danger is that courts in close
(and not so close) cases will adopt that version of the substantive
law that facilitates class action suits. Several examples are in
order from securities law, antitrust, and employment discrimina-
tion.
Let us start with securities law. Basic Inc v Levinson63 in-
volved the question of whether the officers and directors of the
corporation had violated the provision of SEC Rule 10b-5 relating
to the publication of misleading information-in this case a false
denial that the firm was engaged in potential merger negotia-
tions, when in fact it was.6 One effect of this denial was arguably
to lower the price of the shares so as to induce class members to
sell before the merger was formally announced.6 In an ordinary
action for common law fraud, the plaintiffs must prove that they
have relied in specific transactions to their detriment on the false
statements made by the defendant. But, in this case the defen-
dants had not sold any shares; nor did they make any specific
statements to identifiable purchasers. If each plaintiff had been
forced to show his own reliance on some particular false state-
ments, then it would be impossible to keep the class intact. But
once the Supreme Court accepted a "fraud-on-the-market" theory,
which presumes that efficient capital markets quickly embed all
false information into the price, then the element of reliance flips
over from a separate to a common issue, allowing the class to hold
together.' I have no doubt that one reason why the Supreme
Court embraced this substantive theory was to foster the use of
class actions in securities cases. Yet even here, its conclusion can
' 485 US 224 (1988).
Id at 226-29.
' Id at 248 n 27.
Id at 242-47.
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be criticized on the ground that the presumption of reliance is at
most rebuttable, so that the defendant could try to show, on a
case-by-case basis, that individual plaintiffs had disbelieved the
information when published. But rebuttable evidence is admissi-
ble only in a small fraction of cases, so that even the shift in the
burden of proof allows the class action to go forward under stan-
dards that would not be used in individual cases.
The question of causation comes up in other circumstances as
well. In In re Visa Check IMasterMoney Antitrust Litigation,67 the
antitrust issue before the Second Circuit was whether Visa and
MasterCard had adopted tie-in arrangements in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act in setting their interchange fees-that is,
the fees that the acquiring bank (which has signed up the mer-
chant) must pay to the card-issuing bank (which has signed up
the individual consumer).6 Both Visa and MasterCard issue both
credit and debit cards. The former allows for a genuine extension
of credit, but the latter allows the charge to go through only if the
customer in question has sufficient funds in his or her bank ac-
count to cover the charge. It is clear that credit transactions pose
a greater risk of loss than debit transactions, yet in order to ac-
quire the right to use Visa and MasterCard's credit services, the
merchant had to accept all debit cards in these two-sided mar-
kets.w The interchange fees payable on these two accounts are
the same amount, even though the level of risk is different.
In these cases, there is no doubt that the defendant's uniform
policy requiring all participating merchants to "honor all cards" is
a common element in the class action calculus. But it is equally
clear that the level of damages, should liability be established,
may well depend on the interdependence between the inter-
change rates set for debit and credit cards. On this matter, the
initial question is whether the refusal to allow the tie-in ar-
rangement between debit and credit cards would lead to an in-
crease in the interchange fees for the credit card to offset, at least
in part, the decline in revenues from debit cards. The two views
on this subject have been dubbed the "tied product" and the
'7 280 F3d 124 (2d Cir 2001).
Id at 130 n 2.
These are markets that can operate only where the intermediate guarantees to
each side that certain persons on the opposite of the market will be present. Thus no one
will acquire a credit card if there is no place to use it; likewise no one will honor credit
cards if customers do not have them. For an extensive discussion of the issues that these
markets raise, see David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: The Digi-
tal Revolution in Buying and Borrowing (MIT 1999).
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"package method" respectively.0 Under the former, the only ques-
tion asked is what is the difference between the interchange fee
paid and the interchange fee that would have been paid for the
unbundled debit-card product sold on the open market.7' The al-
ternative mode of analysis allows for the recovery of damages
only to the extent that the plaintiff has overpaid for the package
of tied and tying products. 2 Stated otherwise, if the interchange
fee for the ordinary credit card transactions rose to offset in
whole or in part the decline in revenues from the debit card, then
the damages in question would be equal to the savings on the
debit card less the increases on the credit card. That calculation,
obviously, offers a more accurate account of the consequences of
any antitrust violation, but is, of course, more difficult. It is, how-
ever, also true that the simplification in this case necessarily in-
creases the expected liability of the defendant, unlike one that
presupposes that each member of the class has suffered the mean
amount of damages, under which the expected cost to the defen-
dant remains unchanged.
For these purposes, however, this first risk cascades into a
second. Individual merchants within a nationwide (or even single
state) class do not have a fixed ratio of credit to debit transac-
tions: high-end sellers may well sell more by credit card and less
by debit card than low-end merchants. If the offset were allowed
it would create a serious conflict within the class ranks. Indeed,
the increase in credit card rates could leave a merchant whose
customers predominantly used credit cards worse off than before,
creating a serious conflict of interest that breaks up any class,
state-wide or national, of any and all merchants who enter into
debit card transactions. These arguments were voiced vigorously
in the dissent,73 but the majority of the Court held that the class
could be preserved for one of two reasons: either the plaintiff's
expert was correct to assume that the separation of debit from
credit cards would have resulted in no increase in the inter-
change fees for the credit transactions, or that the set-off was not
appropriate as a matter of theory.74 I have no doubt that in an
ordinary action brought by a single plaintiff against a single de-
fendant, a court would, or at least should, follow the economic
"o See Visa Check IMasterMoney, 280 F3d at 142-43.
71 Id.
72 Id.
Id at 153-61, complete with numerical examples.
Visa Check IMasterMoney, 280 F3d at 144.
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rule that requires burdens to be offset against benefits, and com-
mit both parties to proof on this question.15 But once that proce-
dure threatens class certification, then exactly the opposite takes
place. A low standard is used to pass on the merits of the plain-
tiffs claim for class certification, so that the entire matter of the
proper measure of damages is left in abeyance until the class is
formed, to be sorted out only thereafter. 76 The net effect is that
the burden shifts to the defendant to find ways to disentangle
itself from class status only after the armies have massed on the
other side of the table. Yet, as best one can tell, the class forma-
tion itself supplies no new evidence or insight on how the meas-
ure of damage question should be decided. These clear tactical
edges really matter, especially in a lawsuit in which the potential
damages could range, giving trebling, up to $100 billion. Yet the
theme here is not new. It is just another variation of the domi-
nant theme of the measure of damages in Basic where the bene-
fits that follow from some practice-there the false announce-
ment of no merger activity-are ignored while its costs are taken
into account, which can only lead to a perverse form of overdeter-
rence. The desire to preserve the class action has profound conse-
quences on the structure of the substantive law: aggregation pro-
duces intense distortion.
The problem here is, moreover, exceptionally acute because
of the treble damage feature under the Sherman Act.7 That pro-
vision was introduced in part for two related reasons. First, it
could be argued that the concealed nature of antitrust violations
requires the use of some multiple of damages to ensure optimal
deterrence. The second is that trebling offsets the difficulties of
bringing complex individual lawsuits. Note that in this context,
neither problem really matters. The relevant transactions in all
cases are paper transactions, for which concealment is no con-
cern. More importantly, the class action device itself is meant to
offset the difficulties of bringing isolated suits. Combining the
two mechanisms thus creates a form of double counting which
could easily lead to overdeterrence. Yet it would start a palace
revolution to insist that the double-counting problem should lead
" See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, II Antitrust Law 245 n 48 (Little,
Brown 1995) (cited in Visa Check IMasterMoney, 280 F3d at 154).
7 See Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 Duke L J 1251 (2002) (offering a sustained attack on the view that class certifi-
cation should be done without a searching view on the merits).
" See 15 USC § 15(a) (2000).
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to an abrogation of the treble damage rule in anti-trust class ac-
tions brought under the Sherman Act.
Finally, the same theme can be observed in anti-
discrimination cases. Thus Visa Check relied on the earlier deci-
sion in Caridad v Metro-North Commuter Railroad,78 a class ac-
tion suit alleging employment discrimination in discipline and
promotion decisions brought forward under a disparate impact
theory.7 9 The disparate impact theory, of course, allows a plaintiff
to challenge the effect of certain practices without impugning the
motives or intentions of the employers who engage in them.8°
Once the disparate impact is shown, then the defendant can jus-
tify its conduct only by an appeal to business necessity-
everywhere acknowledged as a tough standard to meet.81 Metro-
North was a commuter railroad that employed around five thou-
sand union workers of who around 1,300 were African-Americans
whose employment contracts were governed by some sixteen col-
lective bargaining agreements but subject to Metro-North's Pro-
gressive Disciplinary System (PDS).82 The PDS was administered
at the field level by some four hundred supervisors and manag-
ers, all of who were capable of bringing charges against individ-
ual workers." One complaint, voiced by Metro-North's Affirma-
tive Action Director, expressed concern about the disproportion-
ate number of disciplinary incidents involving people of color. 8 Of
the twenty-seven named plaintiffs, nineteen alleged that they
suffered unfair discipline because of race. 5
On the promotion side, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
clared policy of internal promotion required that all openings be
posted, but gave to the manager of each unit the final power to
fill the vacancy in question.8 In practice, postings were a mere
formality in some cases and omitted in others. 87 The individual
African-American plaintiff alleged that he had been passed over
in favor of four Caucasian applicants who were less qualified
'8 191 F3d 283 (2d Cir 1999).
'9 Id at 286.
8 See Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, 2 Employment Discrimination § 21.01 (Mat-
thew Bender 2d ed 1994).
See, for example, id at § 23.01.
Caridad, 191 F3d at 286.
Id at 287.
Id.
Id.
Caridad, 191 F3d at 287.
87 Id.
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than he was.8 Using a regional standard of proportional repre-
sentation, underutilization of African-Americans was found in
five of eight job categories."
The question was whether this information was sufficient to
support a class action certification, which the district court re-
fused to issue. The Second Circuit, however, overturned that de-
cision as an "abuse of discretion."90 That phrase, however, does
not quite mean what it says, because the standard for abuse is a
lot tougher when the district court refuses certification than
when it allows it. 91 There is of course no obvious explanation
based on the relative competence of district and appellate courts
that supports this one-way ratchet, which turned out to be quite
important in the instant case. Once the moving standard of re-
view took place, the court then noted that the class certification
stage was not the moment to examine the case closely on its mer-
its, and thus allowed the plaintiff's statistical case to carry the
day.' For these purposes, however, the key point is the transfor-
mation of the substantive theory on which this case was brought.
To see why, think about how these cases would be tried as indi-
vidual lawsuits for employment discrimination. The litigation
would start from the ground up with detailed examinations of the
work records of the individual employees, coupled with a close
examination of the charges and countercharges that surrounded
each decision on either discipline or promotion. The outcome of
these cases could be quite different because the workers had dif-
ferent jobs and widely dispersed individuals throughout the or-
ganization had made the decisions on promotion and discipline.
Tried in isolation, virtually the only features that would hold
these cases together are the broad parameters of disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment theory that cannot supply the nec-
essary common element across cases without wholly trivializing
the class action process. In practice, the trial in each case would
depend on fact-specific information. It is for that reason that the
plaintiff class offered an amalgam of statistical and anecdotal
Id.
Id.
Caridad, 191 F3d at 291.
See, Thomas E. Willging, Laurel L. Hooper, and Robert J. Niemic, Class Actions
and the Rulemaking Process: An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 NYU L Rev 74, 171 (1996) ("Between 13% and 26% of plaintiffs' appeals
were successful, in whole or in part, in reversing or vacating trial court decisions in three
courts .... Few defendants' appeals resulted in reversal or vacation.").
Caridad, 191 F3d at 293.
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evidence to state its grievances. 93 The ability of the employer to
show that the individual employee grievance was misguided has
been eliminated. Even a disparate impact case could not survive
a showing that the particular employee had been convicted of
theft, had used drugs, or suffered chronic absenteeism.
In some cases, individual plaintiffs seek to make out dispa-
rate impact by pointing to some firm-wide substantive policy that
fostered some forbidden disparate impact. But in this case the
only relevant general policy was one that delegated to the indi-
vidual units the execution of a system-wide commitment toward
affirmative action. In this context, the defendants might, with
some justification, use its affirmative action program to help ex-
plain any differential rates in discipline or promotion that existed
at Metro-North. After all, an affirmative action program requires
Metro-North to make some high risk moves ex ante, and these
could help explain (perhaps in some units but not in others) the
differential rates in promotion and discipline ex post. A neutral
standard should be expected to yield higher failure rates with the
weaker applicant pool in both cases. It should be clear that these
disparate impact cases have moved a long way from the original
dubious decision in Griggs v Duke Power,' which only asked
whether certain tests might be administered, where the only
relevant datum might be the relative black to white pass rates
wholly without regard to individual performance records.9' There
might be some uncertainty as to which side would introduce what
evidence, but when the dust settled nothing could prevent sub-
stantial levels of individuation in this case.
In the face of this standard mode of proof, any effort to forge
a class action out of either discipline or promotion, let alone the
two together, would (or, alas, at least should) be regarded as
laughable. The aggregation does not make sense. But it is at this
point that the substantive expansion of disparate impact theory
is said to fill the gap under a very generous class standard which
finds that the "commonality" requirement for class actions "is met
if plaintiffs' grievances share a common element of law or of
'3 Id at 286.
401 US 424 (1971). For my criticisms, see Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 192-201
(cited in note 8). Any debate over the statutory authorization of disparate treatment cases
has been set to rest by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Public L No 102-166,
105 Stat 1071. For an account of the modern rules, see Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson,
1 Employment Discrimination § 9.03[2] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1994).
" Griggs, 401 US at 424.
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fact"9 -where the words "a" and "or" deserve to be put into ital-
ics, if not neon lights. The new wrong of the defendant was not its
firm wide rules of equal opportunity or affirmative action. Rather
it takes the novel form of "overdelegation," to wit a "policy-the
delegation to supervisors, pursuant to company-wide policies, of
discretionary authority without sufficient oversight-that gives
rise to common questions of fact warranting certification of the
proposed class."w Judge Newman of the Second Circuit accepted
this theory without any apparent recognition of how far it has
strayed from the original disparate impact cases, in which the
application of the antidiscrimination law requires proof of the
disparate impact of a specific policy on the employment prospects
of a protected group. If proper policies are followed at the unit
level, then any claim of overdelegation counts at best as some
form of harmless error. As stated, the decision takes what may
well be sensible business policy-the decentralization of various
kinds of employment decisions-and treats that as though it were
a fatal wrong. In so doing, this threadbare theory overlooks any
questions of causation: the want of supervision would only matter
if the individual units all deviated from the assigned standards in
more or less the same way. But in each case, a trier of fact would
necessarily have to find that the work done at the unit level fell
below the appropriate standards that should have been imposed
from the center in order for this alleged breach of duty to matter
at all. Clearly the question of unit compliance raises issues that
are not common to the class, even if this new substantive duty is
accepted. In the end, there is ample reason to see why Caridad
was an appropriate precedent for Visa Check. The need to pre-
serve a class action at all costs drives a court to distort the under-
lying theory of substantive liability beyond recognition. We have
more than aggregation at work. We have a wholesale distortion of
the substantive standards, the chief effect of which is to facilitate
a finding of discrimination in cases where it is highly unlikely to
have occurred.
The full extent to which the procedural processes of the class
action turn substantive law inside out is further evidenced by the
subsequent history of Caridad on remand. Once the case was re-
manded to the district court, Judge Rakoff again refused to cer-
tify the class and dismissed the class action, noting the lack of
Marisol A v Guiliani, 126 F3d 372, 376 (2d Cir 1997).
'7 Caridad, 191 F3d at 291.
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common issues on liability.9 What makes this case so striking
was that after the remand in Caridad (Robinson v Metro-North
Commuter Railroad),9 the plaintiff sought class certification ei-
ther under Rule 23(b)(2) or, alternatively, under 23(b)(3). 100 The
latter preserves individual opt-out rights for individual claim-
ants, but Rule 23(b)(2) does not.01 In principle Rule 23(b)(2) reads
like it is reserved for situations like those involving indivisible
benefits to a corporation or other class members.i°e Outside the
corporate context, the paradigmatic case might be injunctive re-
lief against the commission of a widespread nuisance, which nec-
essarily benefits all even if the action itself is brought by some.
In Robinson, however, the denial of any opt-out (at least until
the damage phase) would deny individual plaintiffs control over a
suit in which they have very large stakes. In addition, it hands
the class lawyers a very large club with which to obtain a settle-
ment-and to avoid competition by other lawyers who seek busi-
ness from class members after opt-outs are allowed. The initial
question is whether this trade makes sense in light of the inter-
ests of the class members and the defendants. For individual
class members, the loss of the option to get out of the class has to
count as a real drawback: after all, all options have some positive
value, and the control of one's own litigation cannot be regarded
as a small detail within the overall scheme of civil procedure. But
the question then arises whether the individual plaintiffs receive
any compensation for this total loss of control. In principle, that
compensation can only come if the class aggregation strengthens
their hand against the defendant. The district court in Robinson
refused to change the basic rules of the game and thus refused to
allow the class action to go forward.' °3 The kind of evidence
needed in these cases is a peculiar blend of statistical and anec-
dotal evidence."° The class's statistical evidence was all at the
Robinson v Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co, 197 FRD 85 (S D NY 2000).
Id.
Id at 87.
101 FRCP 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
FRCP 23(b)(2).
103 See Robinson, 197 FRD at 85.
"° The standard formulation of the rule is:
Plaintiffs have typically depended upon two kinds of circumstantial evi-
dence to establish the existence of a policy, pattern, or practice of inten-
tional discrimination: (1) statistical evidence aimed at establishing the
defendant's past treatment of the protected group, and (2) testimony from
protected class members detailing specific instances of discrimination.
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global level, while the defendant could easily introduce evidence
that took place at the unit level.' °5 In addition, none of the anec-
dotal or testimonial evidence could take place at the global level.
Nor is it likely that the situation remained constant over the full
eleven-year period covered in the litigation.
The denial of class action certification in Robinson, suffered
the same ignominious fate on appeal as Caridad.'" Judge Walker,
who had dissented on the class certification question in Caridad,
had no difficulty in holding that the over-delegation theory might
support injunctive relief on "a pattern or practice" claim. °c Hence
he concluded that the theory would support certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) notwithstanding the individualized damage claims,
which could be considered separately perhaps after liability was
established.'8 Here, the first point the court noted was that the
plaintiff was seeking both injunctive relief and damages.' o The
court then noted that the key question was whether the common
issues associated with the injunctive portion of the case predomi-
nated over the separate issues that might arise with respect to
individual causes of action for damages." °
The sensible rule here holds that injunctive relief could never
predominate when individual damage actions are brought. That
rule creates the right "bright-line" rule for this area and avoids
expensive case-by-case determinations. On that view, Rule
23(b)(2) certification becomes permissible only where the plain-
tiff's demand for monetary relief is limited to a demand for inci-
dental damages, which do not require extensive additional fact-
finding but which can be done (as with lost interest) by use of
simple computational devices."' Judge Walker, however, rejected
Larson and Larson, 1 Employment Discrimination § 9.0311] (cited in note 94). This passage
was cited at the appellate level in Robinson, 267 F3d at 158.
See Robinson, 267 F3d at 155.Compare Caridad, 191 F3d 283, and Robinson, 267 F3d 147.
'07 Robinson, 267 F3d at 155-56, 156 n 2.
108 Id at 163-64.
" Id at 155.
"' Id at 162-64.
. See, for example, Allison v Citgo Petroleum Corp, 151 F3d 402, 415 (5th Cir 1998).
The applicable commentary to Rule 23 reads as follows:
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken
action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of
an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling
the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appro-priate.... The subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropri-
ate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.
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this analysis in favor of a balancing test that asked whether the
individual damage claims predominated over the injunctive relief
or the reverse.112
Yet there is absolutely no way to decide how to work this bal-
ance unless one has some idea about the nature of the injunctive
relief that is sought. But of course, no hint of that is offered in
Robinson. It seems almost inconceivable that injunctive relief
would even be on the table in any individual grievance where lit-
tle if anything would turn on the overdelegation theory. It would
of course be grotesque to allow any individual employee to obtain
injunctive relief outside the class action framework. The entire
point of a damage remedy is to create an incentive to avoid viola-
tion of the law, and it seems doubtful that anyone could frame an
injunction that looks both sensible and enforceable.
In addition, any supposed injunctive relief could not benefit
equally all members of a class that covers employees from 1985 to
1996, many of whom had surely been promoted or not disciplined,
and many of whom had doubtless left Metro-North's employ
never to return. Even in a class context, it is hard to think of any
constructive injunctive relief in light of the comprehensive regime
of affirmative action already in place, and which may have been
fine-tuned since 1996, the last year covered by the class.
In principle, class aggregation should not upset the balance
between these two forms of relief, but once again the key distor-
tion sets in not because injunctions make sense for these dis-
putes, but solely because of the greater leverage that the Rule
23(b)(2) class action affords. These effects continue to work their
way through the entire case. Thus Judge Walker noted that if the
entire case could not be certified as a 23(b)(2) class, then the li-
ability phase surely could be-but not if the anecdotal evidence
could freely be introduced."3 So once again we alter the rules in
question. If the entire case cannot be tried as a 23(b)(2) class,
then insulate the liability phase from the elements of the case
that cannot be reconciled with class treatment. "Indeed, to ensure
that the liability phase remains manageable, the district court
may limit the anecdotal evidence as it deems appropriate.""4 In
effect the ability of the defendant to mount an effective defense
Advisory Committee Notes to FRCP 23(b)(2) (1966).
"' Robinson, 267 F3d at 164.
13 Id at 167-69
114 Id.
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on liability in each individual case may be effectively compro-
mised in order to allow the class action proceed as such.
In principle, it looks as though a systematic inability to pre-
sent relevant evidence against a claim counts as a denial of the
right to a full and fair trial, and thus brings into question
whether the class action model as applied comports with the re-
quirements of procedural due process. Judge Walker is indeed
concerned with this issue, but only with respect to absentee
members of the class."" But here of course he comes up with a
two-step argument that solves their problem quite neatly. First
he writes:
Where class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief is sought
in a (b)(2) class action for an alleged group harm, there is
a presumption of cohesion and unity between absent class
members and the class representatives such that adequate
representation will generally safeguard absent class mem-
bers' interests and thereby satisfy the strictures of due
process.116
This assumption might not hold throughout the trial, so a
second adjustment is made as well:
[A]ny due process risk posed by (b)(2) class certification of
a claim for non-incidental damages can be eliminated by
the district court simply affording notice and opt out
rights to absent class members for those portions of the
proceedings where the presumption of class cohesion fal-
ters-i.e., the damages phase of the proceedings.'17
At this point it seems that individual plaintiffs receive hand-
some compensation for the loss of individual control over cases.
They are cut out at the first stage of the case where the simplifi-
cation in liability rules works to their advantage. Then they are
allowed back in the second stage of the case when the damage
issues are on the table. It seems quite clear that the plaintiffs
should not be allowed to raise due process objections against
rules that are heavily rigged in their favor. But this ostensible
cure for one set of due process concerns should sound the alarm
that a second set of due process violations has taken place: the
"5 Id at 165.
Robinson, 267 F3d at 165.
117 Id at 166.
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defendants cannot respond in full to the charges raised against
them because of their inability to raise their defenses to liability.
The fiction that the injunctive relief is common, when the posi-
tion of class members is not, warps the liability phase of the trial
beyond all recognition. The upshot is that the new legal regime
created by the class action rules gives the plaintiffs' lawyers all
the tools they need to bludgeon the defendants into submission on
a disparate impact claim that is far, far weaker than anything
contemplated under the original Griggs decision."" The proce-
dural tail has wagged the substantive dog. The aggregation of
claims has resulted in a powerful distortion of the substantive
law in ways that systematically favor plaintiffs over defendants
in contradiction to the basic model that should govern these
cases.
CONCLUSION
Face it, the class action is here to stay. And so it should, for
there is no question that in some contexts it allows plaintiffs with
sound but small substantive claims to gain access to the court-
house that would be denied to them without some method of
amalgamation. The class action offers the key for taking the dis-
organized business of life and structuring it in simplified ways
that permit mass adjudication. How could anyone such as myself,
who authored a book entitled Simple Rules for a Complex
World,"' be opposed to that development? Yet there is more than
one way in which the issue of simplification goes to the heart of
the current disputes over the propriety of class actions. A genera-
tion ago, no one would have doubted that any individual tort case,
antitrust tie-in case, or employment case was a complex matter
under the applicable substantive law. Often the rules used in
those cases were at sharp variance to those that I would apply to
those same situations. In my view, the multiple factor tests used
in product liability cases are far inferior to a simple common law
rule that asks whether a latent defect of the defendant's product
caused harm to the plaintiff while in its original condition.12° If
this substantive view had prevailed, we would not have to worry
about class actions in tobacco cases, because the generic risks of
... See Griggs, 401 US 424.
"9 Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Harvard 1995).
120 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law (Quorom
1980).
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tobacco are so well-known that they would be routinely barred, as
they indeed were under the natural reading of comment (i) to
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts.2 1 Likewise, I
think that for the most part antitrust law should concern itself in
dealing with horizontal price-fixing arrangements and mergers,
so that exotic tie-in theories (with treble damage actions no less)
would become things of the past. Finally, I would do away with
the disparate impact theory of liability in all employment dis-
crimination cases in their entirety.
In dealing with the soundness of class actions, however, it
will not do to complain about the substantive law as it has been
developed in Congress, state legislatures, and the courts. To do so
introduces unneeded complexity in pursuit of unwise legal ends.
As the rest of this Article has presupposed, throughout the class
action debate, across the board, we have to treat procedural law
as adjectival law that presupposes the soundness of the underly-
ing substantive law. At this point, it is only because the class ac-
tion system does not seem to work as planned in this (as in other)
ways that we should fear or condemn its continued application. It
is sometimes argued (as by Samuel Issacharoff at the class action
Symposium where this talk was originally presented)'2 that the
class action is really the friend of the conservative/libertarian
intellectual because effective enforcement of class actions reduces
the need for direct government regulation that conservatives and
libertarians view with such suspicion. But that criticism misfires
in this context for several reasons. First, it forces us to interject
our views of substantive law into the separate question of
whether, and if so, how, the class action is an effective means of
enforcement for existing legal rights, whatever these may be. But
even if we put that caveat aside, the class action does not neatly
line itself up with the dispute between regulation and private
ordering. The class action is a boon to private contract when it
permits large numbers of individuals to gain refunds of small
sums to which they are entitled under contract. It is also a boon
when it allows property holders to recover damages for the
121 "Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking
may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably
dangerous." Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment (i) to §402A Note that the phrase
'unreasonably dangerous" is the predicate for strict liability under § 402A itself.
" Remarks of Samuel Issacharoff, Legal Forum Symposium November 2, 2002, The
University of Chicago.
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wrongful conversion of their property.1" But if we let the over-
charge be a creature of regulation, then the class action switches
sides, just as it does when it is used to enforce zoning ordinances
against property owners.' 24
Indeed, even if we confine our attention to situations of direct
government intervention, it hardly follows that ordinary private
litigation is preferable to direct government regulation. In the
product liability area, for example, I have long taken the view
that the state should prescribe in advance the standard warnings
that it wishes to impose on certain generic products, and to allow
private damage actions only in the unlikely event that manufac-
turers deviate from those warnings. That one simple rule would
eliminate huge amounts of litigation over the adequacy of warn-
ings, whether on cigarettes or prescription drugs. The lawyers,
both for plaintiffs and defendants, only earn their keep under a
legal environment that maximizes the level of legal uncertainty
on the dubious ground that these mandated warnings are always
less stringent than appropriate. In these cases, I have no doubt
that a direct administrative action trumps a class action by leaps
and bounds. The point is made clear, I think, by looking again at
some of these disputes that have spawned class actions, where it
seems clear that the class action could easily prove to be the odd
man out. In many cases, the appropriate response is to use some
combination of administrative action and ordinary private law-
suits to deal with the questions at hand. The administrators can
fix the defect in line with the substantive objectives of these stat-
utes, while the private actions could allow for redress for those
wrongs that are large enough and clear enough to merit such
treatment. Individuals need not go it alone, moreover, because it
is possible to use permissive joinder techniques to amalgamate of
suits-although even here the courts should be aware of the risk
that aggregation of individual cases will lead to an unjustified
distortion of the substantive law.
To see how all this would work, it is useful to think back to
some of the cases already discussed. In Basic v Levinson,125 the
simple remedy for misrepresentation of the status of ongoing
merger talks is a fine, not a class action. It is doubtful that many
traders suffered large systematic losses from the misrepresenta-
" See, for example, Uhl v Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, Inc,
309 F3d 978 (7th Cir 2001).
124 See, for example, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992).
... 485 US 224 (1988).
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tions, but individual suits are available if they did. The massive
litigation between Wal-Mart and Visa 126 recasts into class form a
dispute that would have been better resolved by a simple admin-
istrative order of the Federal Trade Commission on the relative
interchange fees for debit and credit cards, coupled with a fine to
deal with the matter. In this legal regime, some large retailers
might still choose to bring private antitrust actions, but these are
likely to be for millions, not billions, of dollars. Most people would
just let the matter rest. Likewise, in Caridad,127 the EEOC could
order some modest changes in Metro-North's hiring practices if it
found that they contained some latent defect. The administrative
remedy in some cases could prove superior to the class action be-
cause it could take into account technological or business changes
that occur after the date of the alleged wrong to members of the
class. Most of the individual members of the class would have no
occasion to sue because they were not prejudiced by any of the
promotion or discipline problems under challenge. Finally, the
recalls in Bridgestone/Firestone could easily be handled by ad-
ministrative action and fine, coupled with tort actions for the in-
dividual harms that do take place and a general return policy for
what is left of the useful life of the tires subject to recall.
The basic point is that the class action should be viewed as
one of a set of devices to deal with a set of wrongful acts, both
actual and potential. But all too often, the stout defenders of the
class action write as though only it stands between the individual
consumer, employee, or trader and oblivion. 1 Indeed, it should be
quite evident from the decisions discussed here that it is hard to
believe that the Second and Seventh Circuits are addressing the
same set of Federal Rules under the same body of applicable Su-
" In re Visa Check IMasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 124, 124 (2d Cir 2001).
.27 Caridad v Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F3d 283, 283 (2d Cir 1999).
" See, for example, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Access, Equity and Finality of Adjudica-
tion: The Role of Class Actions in our Civil Justice System, Testimony before the Subcom-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives: Oversight Hearing on
Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits, March 5, 1998:
My clients have been men and women from all walks of life and all parts
of the country who needed to take action to protect their rights, theirjobs, their property, their savings or their local environment; or who sim-
ply sought fair compensation, in their lifetimes, for injuries or losses from
defective or dangerous products.
Id at 3. The rhetorical power of her statement should be evident. But so too its shortcom-
ings. Her clients will take what she can provide, and will not be upset with overcompensa-
tion for admitted wrongs or errors in the system that provides them with relief when none
should be forthcoming.
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preme Court precedent: the cultural gulf between New York and
Chicago proves that one set of judges is from Mars and the other
from Venus. (The reader may determine which set of judges are
from which planet.) The utter divergence in their approaches
should remind us, if a reminder is needed, that error always dogs
the interpretation of any complex body of law. To be sure, the de-
nial of class action means that relief does not go necessarily to
the parties who are injured. And in some cases the deterrence
supplied by other methods might prove to be less (or more) than
ideal. But the class action is also subject to defects in its admini-
stration that compromise its effectiveness at every step. Ulti-
mately, the only question worth asking here is what mix of these
various remedial techniques leads to the fewest imperfections.
That question cannot be answered authoritatively and across the
board one way or the other. But the real and persistent danger of
distortion through aggregation counts as one strong mark against
the class action in its current configuration. Judges got us into
this pickle. Perhaps they can get us out of it.
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